The latest Eurobarometer survey shows a sharp decline in public levels of confidence in the European institutions over the past six months. And the same applies to the euro, symbol of monetary unity - to the extent that in countries facing economic challenges, primarily Italy, politicians are openly discussing leaving the eurozone, with studies by major banks seeming to lend support to this idea. But here, and in all the other new member states, the main goal of economic policy continues to be to get into the euro as quickly as possible. Arguments tend to focus on whether 2010 entry can easily be achieved (the Finance Ministry's view) or whether strenuous efforts are needed to make entry a reality (the Central Bank's).

Sceptical voices at home are in retreat, even though in the eurozone, economic growth is slower than in the EU's two other regions - the non-eurozone old members and the new member states. Meanwhile, the UK, Denmark, Sweden and the new member states continue to enjoy relatively strong growth, unemployment trends are positive. Is it really the euro and all that goes with it (a single interest rate, the stability and growth pact) the cause of the crisis in the Italian, German or French economies? And if so, why rush to join the club?

But bad monetary policy and overly strict fiscal policy are not causing the sluggishness of continental Europe's big economies. They have, in any case, being breaking the fiscal rules for years. But Finland, Ireland and Spain run balanced budgets and have fast growth. That is, the euro and its associated monetary policy and fiscal rules can hardly be the cause of the macroeconomic woes. The problems are structural in nature, the consequence of earlier economic policy failings. If Italy really is the "sick man of Europe", then this is the result of low labour market participation, short working hours, low skill levels and the weakness of research-intensive sectors. Furthermore, Italy's traditional light industries have been overwhelmed by the south-east Asia's dramatic competitiveness advantage. And currency devaluation is no longer an option - although even if it were it would only lead to inflation and state indebtedness.

And if Hungary tried to delay its euro entry, then there is no reason to think it would escape a negative scenario similar to Italy's. Now that Slovakia and Poland have said that they intend to enter the eurozone in 2009 means that for Hungary to delay would mean consigning itself to a peripheral position with respect to its neighbours.